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JAPANESE COOPERATIVE R&D PROJECTS IN SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY
Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu all launched factory efforts between the
late 1960s and late 1970s to promote internal process standardization and to
diffuse good tools and techniques among in-house personnel as well as at
subsidiaries and subcontractors. These companies also maintained R&D efforts
in central and division laboratories, as well as in factory departments, to study
or generate new capabilities, and refine process technology for application.
Software development, and the needs of Japanese customers, presented similar
problems to Japanese producers; not surprisingly, they tended to adopt similar
solutions, creating factory organizations that refined U.S. tools and techniques
while, as in other industries, seeking a tight integration among product
objectives and production management, in the broad sense -- tools, techniques,
controls, training, and components.
It is fitting that this working paper looks beyond the level of software
factories at individual companies to consider mechanisms for taking better
advantage of current knowledge as well as for moving the state of the industry
and the technology forward. Despite limited results, cooperative R&D projects
since the late 1960s in Japan provided a foundation for two major efforts in the
1980s sponsored by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) and carried out
mainly with personnel from private firms: Sigma (Software Industrialized
Generator and Maintenance Aids), which tried to make the tools, techniques,
standards, and reuse concepts refined in software factories more common
throughout the industry, especially at smaller software houses; and the Fifth
Generation Computer Project, which experimented with logic processing and
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parallel computing, areas of artificial-intelligence technology, and the required
innovations in hardware and software architectures.
Comparisons with cooperative projects in the U.S. and Europe, as well as
with efforts at two other Japanese producers not covered in the cases, Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and Mitsubishi Electric, support conclusions
already proposed in the factory cases: The leading Japanese computer and
software manufacturers, on their own and in joint arrangements, were exploring
nearly all available technologies related to software development. Major
projects might not reach all their goals, and much of the technology being
disseminated in Japan remained a refinement of tools and techniques promoted
in the U.S. during the late 1960s and 1970s, rather than constituting a radical
leap forward. Nonetheless, the Japanese demonstrated the skill and commitment
to stay close to the forefront, if not in the lead, in managing the process of
large-scale software development. Nor did this position come easily, as a
relatively long history of failures in joint research preceded the modest
achievements of projects in the late 1980s.
A MIXED HISTORY OF COOPERATIVE PROJECTS
In computer hardware, several government-sponsored projects dating back
to the FONTAC effort of the early 1960s contributed to advances in the skills
of Japanese firms in areas such as processor design, architectural
standardization, graphics processing, and various topics in basic research. In
semiconductors especially, during the late 1970s, several Japanese firms joined
together under MITI sponsorship to develop better capabilities in VLSI
fabrication and design. In software product and process technology, however,
most cooperative efforts led to embarassing failures (Table 8.1).1 Each attempt
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floundered for slightly different reasons, although common themes emerged:
poor planning, disagreements on objectives, and poor results, all affected by the
difficulties of dealing with still-evolving technologies and markets.
Japan Software Company (1966-1972): MITI organized Japan's first cooperative
effort in applied research not tied to hardware (as in the FONTAC) during 1966:
the Japan Software Company, a joint venture of Hitachi, Fujitsu, NEC, and the
Industrial Bank of Japan. The government provided a subsidy of 2 billion yen,
recruited 200 software engineers, and charged them with producing a common
development language that would allow firms to write basic software to operate
on currently incompatible computers.
The effort to devise a common language failed completely. The
architectures of Hitachi, Fujitsu, and NEC machines differed at this time, and
the state of knowledge on portable computer languages remained primitive.
Aside from these formidable technical hurdles, the members became distracted
with different product strategies that, to a large degree, made a common
language unnecessary. Hitachi and Fujitsu decided to adopt IBM-compatible
architectures and thus use IBM as a standard (although Hitachi eventually
varied its domestic architecture slightly). NEC, meanwhile, continued to support
the incompatible architecture inherited from Honeywell. MITI dissolved the
joint venture in 1972, after ending subsidies.2
IPA Package Project (1970-78): Despite problems with the Japan Software
Company, MITI established the Information Processing Promotion Agency (IPA)
in 1970 to promote the software industry in several ways. It provided billions
of yen in operating expenses and loan guarantees for fledgling software
producers, funds for research in software engineering, and money, as well as an
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organization, to develop application packages for general use and register or
buy existing packages for distribution. A major concern of the agency was to
offset the growing, and labor-intensive, demand for custom programs. To
alleviate this problem, the agency allocated 10 billion yen during 1970-1978 for
package development and acquired 70 programs.
While software houses probably welcomed financial assistance in any form,
neither the RD work nor the package initiative proved useful. One problem
was that IPA distributed funding over a large number of small firms that had
insufficient expertise to develop general-purpose tools or programs. Several
other factors severely limited the appeal of the packages: poor planning to
insure that a program had more than one or two users, continued
incompatibility in hardware architectures and operating systems, the strong
preference among Japanese customers for tailored systems, and the insistence of
many Japanese customers that computer manufacturers provide software free of
charge. On the other hand, IPA itself survived into the 1980s and appeared to
be a relatively useful agency, organizing a Software Technology Development
Center in 1981 to conduct RD in areas such as language compilers, CAD/CAM,
database systems, and process methodologies and tools, and assisting in
administering joint projects, including Sigma. 3
PIPS Project (1971-1980): Another MITI and IPA initiative during the 1970s had
a more positive impact on the technical capabilities of individual firms, although
not process technology specifically: the Pattern Information Processing System
(PIPS) project, begun in 1971 with about 22 billion yen in funding over 10
years. This focused on graphics technology needed for Japanese character
(kanji) recognition -- an important topic because of the difficulty involved in
entering and processing Japanese characters on a computer.
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Project members included the major computer manufacturers as well as
MITI's Electro-technical Laboratory, which integrated subsystems developed at
individual firms. Although work done under the auspices of PIPS tended to
merge with initiatives underway at individual firms, companies clearly utilized or
built on some of the technology generated through the project funding. In
particular, both Toshiba and Fujitsu introduced several products, including
machines for the post office that read addresses automatically, and graphics
displays with high resolutions. In addition, much of the experience IPA and
member firms gained in managing and disseminating cooperative R&D, as well as
some of the image-processing technology, they channelled into subsequent
projects, especially Sigma and the Fifth Generation.
Software Module Proiect (1973-1976): MITI in 1973 started a 4-year effort
known as the Software Module Project, channelling 3 billion yen in government
funds to 40 independent software houses organized into five groups to develop
standardized modules for applications programming. The major manufacturers
did not appear to participate at all, however, and this initiative met the same
fate as the IPA package project. The five groups produced little or no
software that customers found appealing, reflecting poor planning and little
coordination among participants regarding the content of the software
developed, languages used, and portability strategies. On the other hand, this
project seemed to generate interest in the concept of reusable modules as well
as the need for standardization in products as well as tools and techniques. IPA
quickly turned its attention to these issues and expressed them as part of a
broader objective -- the software factory.4
Software Production Technology Project (1976-1981): MITI first directly
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promoted the concept of a software factory in its very next initiative, started
in 1976 -- the Software Production Technology Project (also known as the
Program Productivity Development System Project). In the first stage, 17
Japanese firms, with 7.5 billion yen in funding over 5 years, came together to
form the Joint System Development Corporation (JSD) and dedicate themselves
to the creation of an "automated software factory system based on the concept
of application software modularization." Initial objectives included the
development of better languages to describe application systems and program
components in a structured, modular fashion, as well as a module database. The
members also hoped to build and disseminate general-purpose tools to support
modular design, program generation, and testing. JSD itself built nothing but
channelled R&D work to member firms through a series of projects.
Again, despite lofty goals, the project produced few concrete results. No
group seemed to make progress during the first two years at all, prompting the
directors of JSD to change course. Beginning in the third year, rather than
working on centrally designed projects, JSD encouraged participants to use the
government funding to devise support tools geared toward their specific needs,
though still utilizing a base technology, such as a common programming
language. Members completed approximately 20 tools, and individual firms used
some in their facilities. Nevertheless, JSD failed to integrate the tools or
disseminate them widely.
A major cause for this failure stemmed from technical judgments that,
given changes in the technology and industry practices, proved unwise. First,
especially during the initial two years, projects set out to devise tools that
operated in a batch mode. By the late 1970s, however, more powerful hardware
and basic-software capabilites made interactive programming and debugging
through on-line terminals or work stations (rather than writing a program and
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then running it later on) much more efficient and preferable for most
applications. Batch-processing tools thus had limited usefulness by the end of
the project.
Second, members chose to develop tools that supported programming in an
uncommon language -- PL/I. They selected this because it seemed more neutral
than FORTRAN (heavily tailored for engineering applications) or COBOL
(dominant in business applications). In fact, PL/I combined features of
FORTRAN and COBOL as well as ALGOL, an "algorithmic" language for
scientific computations developed in the early 1960s designed specifically to be
independent of hardware architectures and to facilitate automatic code
generation -- important goals of the project.
PL/I thus had many good features and was extremely rich functionally. It
even gained temporary popularity in some segments of the industry (such as
basic-software groups in IBM), and Japanese mainframe producers continued to
use it (or in-house variations) for operating-system development until the mid-
1980s. But PL/I never became accepted as a general programming language. It
proved too time-consuming to learn and difficult to use (in essence, almost
requiring knowledge of all the features of three very different languages). The
difficulty and lack of acceptance for PL/I in most applications limited the
usefulness of the tools, most of which, in any case, supported batch processing.
The project could have changed course with more flexible planning and
foresight, but did not. Company teams carried out plans established in the
early days of the project, so that Japan's cooperative software-factory initiative
consisted merely of a few batch-processing tools for programming in PI/1. 5
SMEF Project (1981-1986): Japanese government planners and company
engineers continued to learn from past mistakes and, in 1981, launched a
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follow-up initiative under the Joint System Development Corporation with 5
billion yen more in funding, called the Software Maintenance Engineering
Facility (SMEF) Project. Not only did this attempt to build a UNIX-based
(Berkeley version) integrated environment for maintaining and developing
software in an interactive (rather than batch-processing) mode, but project
members spent more time in planning, coordination, and reflection, while
achieving more freedom to determine what tools to build. While SMEF
constructed 10 maintenance environments and tool sets, including 8 that relied
on UNIX, this project failed to produce tools considered good enough for broad
dissemination. Still, Japanese companies learned a lot about the UNIX
environment and support tools. In this regard, SMEF proved to be a useful
preparation for Sigma (which followed directly in 1985) as well as for individual
company efforts aimed at utilizing UNIX. 6
Interoperable Database System Project (1985-1989): Once again under IPA
sponsorship, the leading Japanese computer manufacturers, as well as
Matsushita, Sharp, Oki, Sumitomo Electric, and several other firms, formed the
Interoperable Database System Project in 1985. This 5-year program, with a
budget of 1.5 billion yen, adopted the internationally recognized OSI (Open
System Interface) protocols in order to promote communications or data
transfers among various types of hardware (computers and peripherals, office
equipment) from different manufacturers. 7
OSI clearly represented a positive development toward standardization on a
limited but important dimension. As of late 1989, most of the major computer
and peripherals producers in the U.S. and Europe, including IBM, had adopted
the OSI standards along with Japanese firms, and several producers worldwide
had introduced products utilizing these specifications. OSI thus promised to
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ease machine interconnections and simplify the building of networks, although
these standards did not directly address issues such as software reusability or
automation .8
FASET Project (1985-1989) The Joint System Development Corporation took
another bold step in 1985 by launching the Formal Approach to Software
Environment Technology (FASET) Project, with funding of 2.2 billion yen over 5
years, 80% provided by IPA and 20% from industry. JSD staff researchers, as
well as personnel from several JSD member firms -- Case Cachexia Engineering,
Software Research Associates, Kanri Kogaku, Mitsubishi Research Institute, NEC
Software, Japan Information Service Company, and INTEC -- conducted the
research.
As a first objective, FASET members evaluated existing specification tools
and techniques prior to establishing a better methodology for generating
executable code from formalized descriptions of system requirements. As a next
step, they worked on creating a knowledge database of requirements or designs
that developers could draw on in conjunction with tools to support specification
of a software system. The last set of goals proved to be the most ambitious:
to devise a practical but formalized (mathematical or algebraic) methodology for
describing requirements, and then tools for optimization and transformation of
the requirements into executable code (Figure 8.1). The FASET environment also
assumed distributed development over a network of linked work stations and
databases. The project schedule called for completion by 1989 of support tools
for requirements analysis and description, database management, documentation
generation, design retrieval, optimization, and maintenance. Other areas of
research included tools and techniques to detect design errors, software
standards, and methods for transferring specifications to different systems.
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At the least, FASET brought more attention to the important goal of
devising ways to generate computer programs from requirements -- thus
eliminating the need to write detailed system, program, and module designs, as
well as code. Executable requirements also eliminated the need to worry about
reusability, although recycling specifications still seemed a useful way to reduce
time required for developing new systems. Yet the FASET Project appeared to
have little impact. The objective remained technically difficult to achieve
except for very restricted applications, which limited the usefulness of the
tools. Furthermore, the major Japanese software producers -- Fujitsu, Hitachi,
NEC (except for a subsidiary), Toshiba, NTT, and Mitsubishi -- did not directly
participate, limiting the technical skills available to the FASET researchers.
This lack of participation did not mean that the major Japanese computer
producers saw no merit in FASET's agenda. To the contrary, as noted in the
cases and later in this chapter, most of these companies had similar R&D
efforts underway on their own, and probably saw no benefits to participating
actively in this relatively small-scale project. 9
The TRON Project (1984-1990s) Although not a software-engineering effort in
the sense of developing support tools and techniques, or reusability techniques,
a cooperative effort in Japan of rising attention was The Real-time Operating-
System Nucleus (TRON) Project, started in 1984.10 Unlike prior projects, TRON
started as and remained an independent initiative not sponsored by the Japanese
government but conceived by a professor at the University of Tokyo, Ken
Sakamura. Individual firms or researchers then agreed to carry out the work
needed to meet Sakamura's objective: to construct an open family of computer
architectures built around a 32-bit microprocessor, with a high-performance
operating system able to perform multi-tasking and real-time applications.
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The unique feature of the architecture consisted of its design in well-
planned layers, from the lowest level, the instruction-set processor, through the
operating system and applications interfaces. Although developers had yet to
complete all the components, standardized interfaces for each layer would make
it possible for vendors to sell different types and sizes of computers as well as
link them far more easily than most existing operating systems. The
architecture would also greatly simplify communications and data transfer, as
well as portability or reuse of software programs and tools. The ambitiousness
of the effort can be seen in the sub-projects, which targeted embedded
industrial systems (ITON), business-oriented work stations (BTRON), networking
environments (CTRON), and interconnecting software objects (MTRON).
Despite MITI's support of UNIX through the Sigma Project, and TRON's
origins as a private initiative, by 1988, scores of firms had joined the TRON
association, including all the major Japanese computer and software
manufacturers as well as foreign companies such as AT&T and IBM. The
Japanese firms, led by Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Matsushita, NEC, Toshiba,
and NTT, had already introduced TRON VLSI processors and operating systems,
as well as announced research results and concrete product plans. The Japanese
Ministry of Education in 1987 provided a huge boost by adopting TRON as the
operating-system standard for new computers introduced in Japanese schools,
inspired in part by a useful feature of the standard TRON keyboard -- an
electronic pen and tablet that made it relatively simple for users to input
Japanese characters. Some TRON work stations also ran more than one
operating system (such as UNIX as well as TRON), and this seemed likely to
improve the diffusion of the new standard and TRON hardware.
Nevertheless, and despite the technical excellence of the TRON
architecture, this project faced major obstacles in the marketplace. Computer
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producers and, perhaps more importantly, computer users had enormous
investments in existing hardware and software; to rewrite programs to work on
TRON systems presented a daunting task few firms seemed likely to undertake
without excellent reasons. In addition, most computer manufacturers were
currently trying to link the interfaces among their incompatible machines, and
making slow but steady progress. TRON presented a technically better but
radically different solution that essentially involved discarding existing systems.
For new users, TRON offered potential benefits, although software
producers still had to write programs to make the hardware and operating
systems useful. On the other hand, TRON seemed likely to grow in popularity.
At the least, Japanese school children would become widely exposed to TRON
hardware and basic software, and this generation might disseminate the standard
more widely. As the 1990s approached, however, TRON seemed most likely to
remain one of many standards, probably used mainly in Japanese schools and
specific real-time applications in industry where benefits were obvious and firms
did not have major investments in other systems.
THE SIGMA PROJECT (1985-1990)
The Sigma Project, begun in 1985 and slated for completion in 1990, had
about 25 billion yen in funding from government and private sources.11 In
terms of key personnel and goals, it represented considerable continuity with
previous projects the Joint System Development Corporation sponsored,
especially the Software Production Technology and the Software Maintenance
Engineering Facility (SMEF) projects. Also in common with previous
cooperative efforts, Sigma faced organizational hurdles and competition from
still-evolving standards or technologies. Yet it was likely to affect the industry
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positively because of modest goals: Sigma promised not to generate radically
new tools or techniques, but to refine, standardize, and disseminate existing
useful technology based on UNIX and closely resembling the tools used at
Toshiba and other firms. Sigma thus supported a rising trend in that, while
proprietary operating systems still dominated UNIX in market share, many
Japanese firms were independently adopting this for their development
environments and customers. One estimates held that UNIX would constitute
about 25% of the world market for operating systems by 1990, including
Japan. 12
The center of activities for the Sigma Project, the Sigma Development
Office, existed as part of the IPA structure. The staff, consisting of about 50
engineers on loan from 38 companies, took charge of planning, design, and
management of the system. Private contractors building tools numbered at least
50 companies and 300 engineers. In total, as of 1989, 189 companies
participated in the effort in some form. These included the major Japanese
computer hardware and software manufacturers, producers of consumer
electronics, and subsidiaries of U.S. computer makers operating in Japan (AT&T,
Fuji Xerox, IBM Japan, NCR Japan, Nihon DEC, Nihon Sun Microsystems, Nihon
Unisys, Nippon Data General, Olivetti of Japan, Yamatake Honeywell, and
Yokogawa Hewlett-Packard).13
The director of Sigma's planning division, Noboru Akima, and a staff
member, Fusatake Ooi, in stating their objectives in a 1989 article, made it
clear that Sigma relied on concepts directly borrowed from previous factory
efforts and other attempts to structure and automate software development:
"Sigma .... will industrializethe software-production process by using computerized
development facilities and a nationwide communications network....The ultimate
goal of the project is to produce software through manufacturing instead of
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manual labor, moving the software industry from a labor-intensive to a
knowledge intensive industry."14 While Japanese companies pursued similar
goals on their own, Sigma's potential contribution went beyond the individual
firm: creation of a platform on which to integrate tools and hardware or reuse
code from various vendors, and then make these tools and software available
through an open network.
The project proceeded in two stages. In the first (1985-1987), researchers
designed a prototype platform to evaluate user responses. This consisted of a
hardware system, operating-system specifications, software tools, and a network
to share tools, computer programs, and other information. In the second phase
(1987-1990), they enhanced and finished the prototype systems. Beginning in
spring 1990, the Sigma hardware platform and software were to become
commercially available from several vendors. Customers also had to pay a fee
to operate the system and support R&D to improve the network as needed.
The system contained three major components: the Sigma Center, the
network, and the user sites, expected to number about 10,000 (Figure 8.2). The
Sigma Center, located in downtown Tokyo, assisted users who were building
Sigma environments and then producing software. The Center provided database
services and demonstrations of tools, rather than time-sharing or remote job-
entry services. The database services included information on existing software,
such as applications and basic-software packages (although few were available,
because of limited funds), tools, and database-management systems; software
firms, such as what services companies offered; the Sigma system itself;
available hardware; software standardization, such as technical articles, and
Japanese as well as international practices; and other systems.
The network, the high-speed Digital Data Exchange-Pack Switching (DDX-
PS) system leased from NTT, connected the Sigma Center to user sites and
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external networks as well as user sites to each other. It handled Japanese
characters and functions for message communication (electronic mail, bulletin
boards, conferences) and file transmission (data, programs, documents), and let
users access computers from remote locations, allowing them to test how a new
program ran on a particular machine.
User sites came with Sigma work stations, a local area network (LAN), and
the Sigma Gateway, which facilitated communication and converted protocols
between the system and different hardware. The work stations were 32-bit
machines with a high-resolution display, graphics support, and use of a mouse.
While initial target prices came in at over $20,000, inexpensive versions
appeared by 1989 for the equivalent of about $12,000. These probably would
drop further since nearly a dozen firms had agreed to make the work stations
and operating systems (Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, NEC, Oki,
Omron, Sharp, Sumitomo Electric, Toshiba,and Yokogawa), all according to
common specifications so they could run the Sigma operating system and have
the same communication protocols. Users, therefore, would be able to assemble
equipment of varying capabilities and deploy the machines in different ways, but
still be able to communicate with other Sigma sites and the Sigma Center, as
well as exchange tools and programs.
The external specifications of the Sigma operating system, designed by the
Development Office staff, combined the better features of two versions of UNIX
-- AT&T System V and Berkeley Software Distribution Version 4.2 -- while
adding capabilities forJapanese-language processing, graphics, multiplewindows,
and databases. Individual manufacturers had to write the internal designs and
actual code to complete their specific version of the operating system, tailored
to different hardware systems.
The Sigma network provided approximately 30 support tools for each
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development phase (Figure 8.3). The Sigma Development Office made and
contracted for the tools, while member firms could put additional tools onto the
network that met the interface specifications. Tools supported software
development in COBOL as well as in FORTRAN and C, as well as assembly
languages. Several tools also specifically supported engineering applications.
As of late 1989, Sigma was completing its testing phase, with more than 50
companies assisting in the evaluation of tools. There remained gaps, such as
the shortage of applications packages and no good tools to support testing or
designing the internal specifications of modules (which FASET was attempting).
However, a few research groups were working on advanced tools for higher-
level language processing and graphics-based prototyping. Future plans also
called for Sigma to continue as a private company after 1990, jointly owned by
the members, not only to maintain the system and the network but also to
continue upgrading tools and network capabilities.
In addition to standardization of external specifications to facilitate tool
portability, the open nature of the system allowed users to modify tools ordered
through the Sigma office, again following the practice in Japanese software
factories of tailoring tools to particular applications. To facilitate modification,
when Sigma asked a vendor to develop a particular tool, rules called for the
data architecture and source code that implements the tool to be available to
users. The original tools ordered by Sigma become the joint property of Sigma
and the vendor, and if a user desires to modify the tool, then negotiations must
take place to determine royalties. Manufacturers of work stations who offered
a tool might pay another firm to modify it to run on its work station or
perform the modifications itself, paying only a licensing fee for the tool as
determined by negotiations with the Sigma office. Firms that placed their
proprietary tools on the Sigma network did not have to share source code. 15
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The objective of the tools and the overall support environment, again
similar to factory approaches, was to provide support technology to reduce the
need for highly skilled programmers, while still allowing users to tailor process
technology, within limits that respected the network specifications and the
rights of tool inventors. As Akima and Ooi asserted: "Sigma ... supports all
development phases and reduces the dependency of development efficiency on
the skills and experience of each engineer. However, different software
projects require different development environments. Furthermore, the
development environment should keep growing and improving as advanced tools
are introduced into the market. The Sigma system lets the development-
environment designers customize the basic system to create an optimal
development environment of their own. "16
Another feature of Sigma, shown in Figure 8.2, is the integration of a
software parts library onto the network. Similar to the systems at Toshiba and
other Japanese software factories, the library contained documentation, program
skeletons, and executable subroutines. A program-composition tool also
generated source code from the design skeletons. As in the case of Toshiba
and other firms emphasizing reusability, however, the value of this library
depended on how well its contents matched customer requirements, and how
systematic management promoted development of code for reuse and
construction of new programs from reusable modules.
Individual Japanese firms were modifying some in-house tools for the
Sigma network. Hitachi, for example, created a version of SDL/PAD to run on
UNIX so that it would qualify as a Sigma tool. Other manufacturers, ranging
from computer firms already heavily in the tool-development business to
consumer-electronics manufacturers just entering the computer or peripherals
markets, found Sigma attractive as a way to sell or lease tools. NTT, Hitachi,
Toward the Future17
Fujitsu, NEC, Data General, and Digital Equipment also benefitted by providing
computer hardware and other systems for the Sigma Center. For many
potentially useful tools already commercially available in Japan, however, Sigma
provided no assistance. These included EAGLE, SEA/I, and an array of Fujitsu
tools that ran on large computers incompatible with UNIX.
Sigma offered perhaps the most promise for small firms wishing to improve
their level of support technology, although several issues remained unresolved
for the government and tool developers. One obvious topic related to tool and
code ownership, including network security. While the project set up an
arbitration mechanism to settle disputes, tool modification and negotiated fees
presented areas ripe for disagreements, especially if the open structure of the
UNIX network allowed users to tap into databases and get access to tools and
source code without the knowledge of the owners. 1 7
Debates also continued in the U.S. and Europe regarding what versions of
UNIX should become the international standard. This controversy positioned
AT&T, which held the rights to UNIX and promoted Version V, against other
firms that did not want AT&T to control the future of the system. While
Japanese firms and Sigma might pursue an independent course, conflicts seemed
likely over the evolution or international standardization of UNIX as well as
over who owned the copyright to software based on the Sigma version of
UNIX. 18
Maintaining compatibility as well as harmony within Sigma presented
another set of challenges, even putting aside the fact that member companies
continued to support other versions of UNIX and many different operating
systems for their individual product lines. Though they remained compatible
with tools and programs on the network, Sigma in 1989 already had
approximately a dozen firms creating different versions of the Sigma operating
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system. Most expressed dissatisfaction with aspects of the existing standards
and tried to introduce improvements, thus keeping the Sigma staff constantly
concerned with standardization and compatibility.19
A related dilemma was how competitive and popular the Sigma work
stations would prove to be with Japanese users. The Japanese were accustomed
to using time-sharing terminals and proprietary work stations connected to
mainframes. They also had the option of buying many other types of less
expensive hardware, including proprietary work stations from the major vendors
as well as NEC, IBM-compatible, and Apple personal computers, and even new
machines running the TRON operating system. In software factories, managers
eliminated this issue of choice by determining what hardware their developers
would use. The Sigma staff, in contrast, had no control over users.
Every producer also faced a tradeoff between standardization and progress.
While Sigma promised to disseminate practical tools and techniques, as in
Japan's software factories, standardization also constrained technological
evolution. Producers of the Sigma operating system had already voiced
objections to the common specifications because they saw better ways to design
the system. In addition, Sigma had no choice but to evolve within the confines
of UNIX, a product of the late 1960s with a variety of limitations. More
radical product and process innovations, such as represented by TRON, the Fifth
Generation Project, and numerous efforts in the U.S. and Europe, would be
difficult for Sigma users to assimilate.
Nor did Sigma, in contrast to individual software factories, provide users
with a management structure to accompany tools and further objectives such as
effective project management or reusability. In its early phases, Sigma also
suffered from weaknesses similar to preceding cooperative projects. A few eager
government officials, managers, and academics took the lead without
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incorporating adequate input from sophisticated users and producers, such as
organizations in Japan of software engineers, UNIX users, and university
departments in information technology, although the project directors seem to
have realized this and allowed their plans and objectives to evolve.
A final issue with regard to the value of Sigma tools and hardware
remained: As in the case of SDC and other factories, tools always proved to be
of limited value in software development. Individual firms and managers had to
add the critical elements Sigma lacked -- such as the management and training
infrastructures needed to use the tools effectively or produce reusable software
and high-quality products systematically. There were no guarantees that small
software houses would make the necessary investments in their organizations
and people, although, based on the historical record established in other
sectors, it seemed unwise to underestimate the determination and capabilities of
Japanese companies in any industry.
OTHER EFFORTS: NTT AND MITSUBISHI
Japanese companies other than those discussed in the cases also had
underway important efforts in software support technology, some comparable to
Sigma and others attempting to move beyond this to more advanced
technologies. After Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu, the two most important
companies in terms of market shares and technical skills were NTT (Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone), the largest firm in the world measured by the value
of outstanding shares and Japan's biggest systems integrator; and Mitsubishi
Electric, a diversified electrical and electronics equipment producer that made
commercial and industrial computers as well as software, primarily for the
Japanese market.
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Nippon Telegraph and Telephone: As noted in previous chapters, NTT had for
years played an important role in promoting quality control and standardization
among Japanese computer manufacturers through its procurement of hardware
and software for telephone and data-processing systems. Of particular
significance has been DIPS (Distributed Information Processing System), begun
in 1969 as Japan's domestic telephone switching network.2 0 Although NTT
produced some actual code in house or at newly formed subsidiaries, primarily
for information systems it used internally, for much of the software it used,
NTT personnel (about 6000 were involved in software development during 1989)
completed only requirement specifications and functional designs, and then
transferred documentation to subcontractors (including Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu,
and others) to build the actual software. NTT followed the same process with
hardware, issuing designs only and contracting out for manufacturing.2 1
Channelling programing tasks to several organizations required
standardization of specifications, designs, coding, and documentation, as well as
an excellent mechanism for quality control to assure comparability and
compatibility. NTT thus cultivated various standards and controls since the
1960s, and these had an impact on the practices of its suppliers. For example,
its encouragement of the use of structured flow-charts for detailed design,,
which it called Hierarchical Compact Charts (HCP), contributed to their
acceptance at other Japanese firms during the 1970s. 22 NTT's rigorous quality
standards also provided a model for other firms to improve their commercial
operations.
As NEC, Fujitsu, and Hitachi became large-scale software producers during
the 1970s and 1980s, they appeared to advance beyond NTT in technical skills
and support technologies for program design and construction. However, along
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with becoming a private firm in 1985, NTT introduced several initiatives that
promised to improve its capabilities in software. These included the
establishment of a centralized Software Development Division (SDD) and a new
subsidiary, NTT Software, which adopted factory organizational concepts and
technologies similar to the Sigma system, as well as an extensive RD network,
much of it devoted to software tool and methodology development.
The Software Development Division employed several hundred personnel at
two main sites in Tokyo, with other groups linked through networks and on-line
tools. 23 NTT had formerly dispersed these personnel throughout the Data
Communications Sector and other groups developing basic software and videotext
programs (Figure 8.6). Management assigned the new division four roles:
(1) Program Production Process Standardization: standardize the way groups
designed modules, module interfaces, and functional procedures, and did
coding, in order to improve reusability of software across different
projects. As in the other major Japanese firms, NTT relied heavily on
structured design charts and code generators.
(2) Program Production: implement specifications produced by industry-related
or functional divisions in the Data Communications Sector utilizing a
standardized process and tool set to serve as a software factory, focused
on program construction rather than only design.
(3) Enhancement and Maintenance of Debugging System: maintain the
debugging system NTT had developed for use by most software developers
within the company.
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(4) Production Support System R&D: conduct applied process R&D, including
tools and techniques for automating program generating and reusability.2 4
The NTT Software Laboratories, part of the company's central R&D
organization, conducted advanced R&D in language processing and design
support, integrated software-development support and reuse systems, and
systematization of production techniques and standards. The integrated
production and reuse-support systems came in several versions, apparently for
different product types, although they relied on NTT's communications network
and the UNIX V operating system, as did Sigma.
For example, NTT introduced a major tool set for switching-systems
software design during 1985-1988, called INSTEP. After noting a doubling of
productivity over a large number of projects, NTT began moving much of its
software design and in-house programming operations onto integrated support
systems that provided a unified interface between the operating system and
various tools. 2 5 Other versions of this concept included NAPSE (NTT Advanced
Programming Support Environment) and SPACE (Software Production and
Circulation Environment), which supported Ada, C, and COBOL. 26
Most of the tools and techniques under development in NTT laboratories
had counterparts in other Japanese firms, although NTT's researchers
demonstrated particularly broad interests. Projects ranged from an Ada
compiler that operated on different computers and target machines, to an
automatic remote-testing system that made it possible to test switching and
communications software from dispersed locations and without direct human
intervention. 27 In the design area, NTT offered several promising tools: HD
(HCP Design), a prototype of a CAD system, helped users write designs in HCP
charts, even if they did not understand all the HCP conventions, as well as
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reuse existing designs and automatically generate code. 28 SoftDA, another
chart-based design system, supported reuse of designs and code as well as
allowed users to execute and correct designs in a dynamic mode, among other
functions. Adam, a module management system, supported reuse of flow-chart
designs, code, and specifications. SDE (Software Design Environment), another
experimental tool, facilitated design and maintenance of communications
software, with a specialized language that described communications functions
and a subsystem that automatically translated specifications into executable
code. The laboratories also worked on various Al and knowledge-processing
technologies .29
Mitsubishi Electric: Mitsubishi had only a small market share in the Japanese
data-processing industry (see Table 4.1) and many of its customers came from
the Mitsubishi group. Among users of its hardware, however, the company
scored well in various areas related to systems and applications programming
(see Chapter 1 and Appendix C). Mitsubishi also experimented with a factory
organizational approach as well as conducted advanced RD on software tools
and methodologies.
Mitsubishi's main center of software development, the Computer Works,
located in Kamakura, nearby Tokyo, developed hardware as well as basic
software and applications programs. In late 1987, it had approximately 700
personnel in applications and basic software serving 300 systems engineers (the
later remained organizationally outside the Computer Works). The structure
introduced in 1987 separated systems engineering from applications development.
Mitsubishi then combined applications with basic software, and systems
engineering with computer sales, and operated each of these two groups as a
set of independent profit centers by product (machine) line. Management did
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this to make both the systems-engineering and basic-software groups more
conscious of costs and profits, as well as to provide more opportunities for
streamlining software production. 3 0
The tools in use at the Computer Works and under development closely
resembled those in the Sigma Project and other Japanese firms that utilized
UNIX. Mitsubishi built an integrated UNIX work bench (also offered through
Sigma) for technical or embedded engineering software, called SEWS (Software
Engineering Work Station). This operated with Mitsubishi's SOLON (Software
Engineers Land-On Network) for distributed development across multiple sites.
The system supported NTT's HCP structured charts and automatic code
generation in C and assembly language, as well as object-oriented interfaces
among modules, high-speed graphics and text displays, and use of a mouse to
point to objects on screens to reduce the need to input text or commands on a
keyboard 31
Mitsubishi's Information Systems and Electronics Development Laboratory,
located next to the Computer Works, also established an experimental software
factory on one floor of its facility in 1985, to serve as a working area for
software engineers in the laboratory and as a pilot model for an integrated
software development environment. This included common facilities (review
rooms, terminals), work stations linked by local-area networks, standardized
development and management procedures, and a formal system for program
registration and reusability promotion.32
Reuse promotion also resembled the approaches of other Japanese firms as
well as Sigma. Mitsubishi defined frequently reusable black-box parts,
consisting of general-purpose executable subroutines, and specialized white-box
parts, in the form of designs or executable code and intended for specific
applications. Mitsubishi departed somewhat from other firms in its use of a
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separate group of "reuse engineers," for both basic and applications software,
whose job consisted of reviewing existing designs and code as well as newly
written software for potential reuse or modification for reuse (Figure 8.7).
Other Japanese firms utilized reuse engineers probably as much or more than
Mitsubishi, although none made this function quite so explicit. Other Japanese
software factories tended to allocate engineering time either to building
reusable packages, patterns, or subroutines, or to reviewing existing or newly
written software for potential reuse, but without creating a special group for
33re-engineering.33
THE FIFTH GENERATION COMPUTER PROJECT (1982-1991)
Although publicity waned after the initial years, Japan's Fifth Generation
Computer Project had already made an important impact on the world's artificial
intelligence community by the late 1980s, stimulating research in Japan as well
as in the U.S. and Europe. 3 4 Since the project architects hoped to develop a
new type of hardware and software that would revolutionize the way people
interacted with and used computers in the future, its broad goals made the
Fifth Generation Computer Project both intriguing and unlikely to fulfill its
more dramatic expectations. In addition to encouraging basic research in an
important area of computer technology, the project settled on a few specific
technical targets and promised limited but concrete results by the termination
date in 1991. As of late 1989, however, Japan had announced no plans to
continue the venture, suggesting some dissatisfaction with the results so far.
MITI initiated the project in 1982, after two years of study, as a 10-year
program starting with 50 researchers (90 in 1989) and housed in the newly
created Institute for New Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) near
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downtown Tokyo. The schedule called for three phases: study of existing
knowledge in the fields of logic processing and parallel computing, and the
development of prototype hardware and software systems (1982-1984);
construction of small-scale subsystems for logic processing and parallel
computing (1985-1988); and completion of a full-scale prototype (1989-1991). 3 5
The finished computer was expected to build both inference and knowledge-
based functions into the hardware, thus facilitating extremely fast processing
speeds, while the basic software controlled the hardware and provided a
platform for a knowledge database-management program and applications.
The term "fifth generation" referred to the evolution of circuit
components, although the major difference with the new computer lay in its
architecture -- how it processed data, instructions, and other information. The
first four generations consisted of computers built with vacuum tubes (1950s),
transistors (1960s), integrated circuits (1970s), and then very large-scale
integrated (VLSI) circuits (1980s), that processed data or instructions one at a
time in a sequential fashion, following the design of the mathematician John
von Neumann. The fifth generation would also use VLSI chips (of the latest
variety) but deploy them in a different way.
The premise of the research held that von-Neumann architectures limited
the capabilities of computers and that significant progress in artificial
intelligence, expert systems, knowledge processing, automatic programming, and
other advanced applications required moving away from conventional algebraic,
sequential instructions and data sets. ICOT worked to perfect a machine that
processed information in the form of "predicate logic" statements or inferences,
and did this in a parallel rather than a sequential fashion (i.e. parcelling out
pieces of a program to different processors that acted on the instructions or
data simultaneously and then combined the results), much as the human brain
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appeared to funciton. Existing computers already used forms of parallel
processing, but primarily with a small number of processors and with
conventional data and instructions merely broken down into pieces. The new
hardware would incorporate a thousand parallel processors and process
information at a calculation speed considerably faster than existing computers.
The software specifications called for several complementary functions:
problem-solving inference capabilities, to perform deductive and inductive
inferences; knowledge-base management technology, to express, collect, store,
and retrieve various types of information required by the inference functions;
intelligent interfaces, to allow people and the computer to converse in natural
languages; and intelligent programming capabilities, to enable "persons without
specialized knowledge to write programs easily" (Figure 8.4). Each of these
objectives constituted a modular subsystem of the basic software. Working
groups, organized under several larger laboratories, conducted research in each
area (Figure 8.5).
Pioneering such technology was expensive and, not surprisingly, the Fifth
Generation had the largest budget among Japan's cooperative efforts in
computer technology, with approximately 50 billion yen allocated over ten years,
paid for entirely by the Japanese government. This amount constituted merely
half MITI's original proposal, since MITI had anticipated (but did not receive)
contributions from private firms. Hitachi President Katsushige Mita accepted
the presidency of the venture and eight companies -- Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC,
Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Oki, Matsushita, and Sharp -- eventually agreed to send
researchers to the project, at the government's expense. Companies declined to
contribute financially, and only the company that agreed to build the hardware,
Mitsubishi Electric, seemed to display much enthusiasm for the project.
The lack of enthusian reflected several factors. The risky and difficult
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nature of the research presented a major difficulty in that it seemed to have
no immediate commercial applications. Another characteristic of ICOT that
probably made the effort uncomfortable for the participants was that, unlike in
previous cooperative arrangements, which tended to have a small staff
developing plans and then contracting work out to individual firms, the Fifth
Generation called for most research to occur in common laboratories with
personnel on full-time assignments. ICOT sponsored some important research at
individual firms, but the structure required strict and common technical targets,
and this made it difficult for any one firm to use funds to subsidize internal
R&D or seize the advantage in capitalizing on research results, if any proved
commercially viable.
In the initial phase during 1982-1984, ICOT researchers examined existing
technologies on knowledge processing, synthesized the results, and successfully
built a personal sequential inference (PSI) machine to serve as a tool and work
station for research. This had approximately 100 processing elements, about
one-tenth the number of the envisioned final system. They also experimented
with a design for an operating system utilizing a logic language rather than a
conventional computer language.
During 1985-1988, the researchers studied how to use and control groups
of the PSI machines (Multi-PSI) for the actual goal -- knowledge and inference
processing in a parallel mode. This required creation of a parallel hardware
architecture as well as extension of an existing logic language to make it
suitable for programming in a parallel fashion. The researchers also began work
on basic tools and techniques for building a knowledge-processing system (KIPS)
and a knowledge-base subsystem (an advanced relational database called Delta)
that took advantage of the parallel architecture.
The basic software consisted primarily of parallel control functions as well
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as logic or inference rules that allowed programs to act upon information stored
in the relational database. To write the core software, ICOT initially chose
PROLOG, a language developed in the early 1980s to support programming in
mathematical logic. Writing a program in PROLOG requires constructing rules
or hypotheses, as well as objectives or conditions, that a programmer wants to
test, and providing data on which the rules can operate. It is a powerful
language but proved difficult to learn and few programmers had experience with
it.3 6 In addition, the authors of PROLOG had designed it for sequential rather
than parallel processing.
After some criticism and reflection, ICOT explored alternatives to PROLOG
and developed an extended low-level version specifically for parallel processing
called Flat Guarded Horn Clauses (FGHC). This proved suitable for specifying
the interface between the hardware and the software needed to process
information in parallel. Using the computer then required the development of
problem-solving inference programs and knowledge-base management software.
ICOT employed a system description language developed in the first stage,
Extended Self-Contained PROLOG (ESP), to create object-oriented modules and
subroutines (macros) for applications that could run in a sequential mode. The
relational database used predicate-logic inferences (rules) to perform particular
functions or carry out specific instructions, rather than processing data
sequentially or simply finding and matching identical words or pieces of data.
The pilot tool for software development consisted of a sequential inference
machine that used a version of sequential instruction processing, as in von-
Neumann architectures, modified for parallel processing. But, as of late 1989,
ICOT had made only limited progress toward building tools that assisted in
intelligent programming or automating software development. Some advances
came in methods for object-oriented modular programming using ESP and
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parallel-programming languages, and early experimental work on a software-
development consultation system for parallel programming found some interest
among developers of telephone switching systems. But most tool work centered
on limited goals, such as theorem proving and mathematical verification
techniques, including a computer-aided proof system. Still under development
were Argus, a tool for program synthesis from high-level descriptions, as well
as a software knowledge-management system to support library management,
program and document generation, and other functions involved in developing
logic programs. Work on intelligent interface software concentrated on studies
of Japanese grammar and syntax, as well as semantic and contextual analysis,
fwith most of this RD located at a subsidiary project, the Japan Electronic
Dictionary Research Center.
A few groups outside ICOT proper pursued applications. One potentially
useful tool consisted of a programming-support system produced at Fujitsu.
This included an English-like specification language mechanically translated into
predicate logic formulas, and a logic-based system to retrieve reusable software
modules, stored by function, from a modules library. The library also stored
specifications for each module, coded in PROLOG, which the tool compared with
requirements to identify functionally equivalent modules reusable for particular
parts of a new program. These capabilities resembled conventional reuse-
support systems in use for several years but added superior retrieval and
verification capabilities. Earlier reuse-support methods located modules by
matching specifications or code, whereas the PROLOG system made it possible
to identify modules with similar functions even if the specifications did not
match in a conventional search process. In addition, another capability of the
tool, which supported reuse as well as maintenance, was an "explanation
generator." This analyzed code and produced English-like explanations of the
Toward the Future31
III
program logic by comparing the code with preexisting templates (skeletons) of
explanations stored in a separate database. 3 7
Plans for ICOT's final stage of research during 1989-1991 remained vague,
in part because work had not proceeded as quickly as desired. In particular,
hardware development remained one or two years behind schedule, although
researchers still expected to finish the hardware and the basic software by
1991, in addition to exploring techniques for knowledge processing, natural-
language processing, and a few experimental applications, such as expert
systems.
Unlike Sigma, ICOT did not distribute or license technology as commercial
products. Rather, the Fifth Generation Project was in the business of basic
research. Individual participadnts had to transfer technology to their parent
organizations and pursue commercial applications. Some companies did introduce
tools that processed or utilized PROLOG, as in Fujitsu's case, although their
market remained unclear. In fact, many Japanese laboratories now contained
PSI machines made by Mitsubishi Electric, although few researchers outside of
ICOT projects appeared to utilize them. Perhaps the major benefits of ICOT
would not exceed the stimulation of basic research. In fact, the project's
directors encouraged this within and outside its membership by establishing an
Al Center in 1986 to monitor activities of Japanese and foreign firms in the
field and by organizing annual conferences to disseminate research results and
promote information sharing.
U.S. experts who examined the progress of ICOT through 1987 as part of
the Japanese Technology Evaluation Program (JTECH), an effort supported by
the U.S. National Science Foundation, made several observations regarding the
project's objectives and achievements. 3 8 Most important, they concluded that
the researchers had made significant progress in areas of Al such as speech and
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image processing, language translation, and expert systems, at least matching
U.S. efforts in these areas and "even teaching us a lesson in the speed of
development and smooth industrial coupling of these commercially-directed
efforts." This seemed true even though many of the results required special
hardware, Japanese did not use the machines widely, and many results remained
far from commercial application without much more RD.
The evaluation team expressed a concern that the reliance of the project
on logic programming, even with the invention of a new version of PROLOG for
parallel processing (FGHC), presented both benefits and limitations. On the one
hand, this focus gave the project clear direction and made it likely to meet
basic technical targets (even if society did not quickly advance to new uses of
computers). On the other hand, ICOT did not directly address promising areas
of Al research, such as programming in LISP (a more common language than
PROLOG that processes data and functions in the form of lists of symbolic
expressions) or experimenting with neural networks (groups of many small-scale
parallel processors that mimic how the human brain processes information).
While Japanese companies pursued these and other technologies in their own
laboratories, the Fifth Generation represented a significant effort and potential
diversion from more practical technologies. The eventual value of ICOT thus
depended heavily on how useful logic programming turned out to be, and this
remained difficult to predict.
Nevertheless, and despite uncertainties over the future of logic
programming, the U.S. experts appeared unanimous in their praise for the
project's "superb software engineering design work." In the related area of
super-computer hardware and software development, the panel found the
hardware to be "world-class" and "the software work competitive with, if not
superior to, the best quality output in the United States," even though project
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planners dropped initial plans to develop new VLSI technology to go along with
R&D in parallel architectures, programming, and Al.
COMPARABLE U.S. AND EUROPEAN EFFORTS
Comparisons with U.S. and European cooperative projects reinforce the
conclusion that Japanese software producers and researchers were not only in
the mainstream but at least close to the forefront in research on standards as
well as advanced technologies related to software development. In the U.S., the
most prominent example of a cooperative effort was the Microelectronics and
Computer Corporation (MCC), founded in 1983 and located in Austin, Texas.3 9
This R&D consortium had a staff of about 400 in 1989, an indeterminate
lifespan, and a budget of $70 million per year. Membership (the shareholders)
included leading U.S. producers of electronic equipment, components, and
materials: 3M, Advanced Micro Devices, Bell Communications Research, Boeing,
Control Data, Digital Equipment Corporation, Kodak, Harris, Hewlett-Packard,
Hughes Aircraft, Lockheed, Motorola, National Semiconductor, NCR, General
Electric, Rockwell, and Westinghouse. Research centered on four broad areas:
(1) software technology (productivity and quality enhancement tools and
methods); (2) semiconductor packaging and interconnection technologies
(substrate materials, chip attachment, cooling and manufacturing methods); (3)
VLSI/CAD systems (design support for very large integrated circuits); and (4)
advanced computer architectures (divided among three laboratories--
Al/Knowledge-Based Systems, System Technology, and Human Interface).
In software production, the specific R&D topics resembled work in Sigma,
ICOT, FASET, and other Japanese projects as well as the laboratories of NEC,
Toshiba, Fujitsu, Hitachi, NTT, and Mitsubishi. All were trying to create tools,
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methods, and concepts to support an integrated design environment that
included a full range of tools, including reuse support and automatic code
generation. But its combination of theoretical studies, such as on the design
process, knowledge processing, and coordination among large teams, with
empirical research on projects at member companies, distinguished MCC's
research.
Much of the effort in software technologies research at MCC concentrated
on requirements specification, which usually required a great deal of time and
expertise. Work on this theme included examining design decisions, rapid
prototyping and simulation technologies, traceability of design steps, knowledge
representation schemes (especially for "fuzzy" knowledge not easily expressible
as, for example, Os or s), and reuse of designs. The reuse work included tools
incorporating expert-system techniques to analyze existing code and
specifications in order to extract the underlying architecture, which could then
be deposited in a database as design components for future reuse or
maintenance. Other areas of research covered generic design representations,
which could be compiled into different languages, as well as tool integration
through platform standardization, and group coordination and management,
through highly integrated and automated project-management tools and
databases. These appeared especially useful for building distributed, embedded
systems (software encased in hardware, with the hardware spread in more than
one location) in multiple teams. 4 0
As with any cooperative effort, where members were likely to have
disparities in skills, objectives, and resources, MCC encountered problems.
Member companies have disagreed on research agendas and thus supported
different projects, with licensing rights to research results dependent upon what
work each funded. This structure restricted coordination and technical sharing,
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even in areas developing complementary technologies, such as VLSI and
software.41 Members were also supposed to provide many of the personnel but
they did not always send their best researchers to the venture, leading MCC
management to hire its own staff. In 1988, for example, only about 30% of
researchers came from member firms. The drawback was that MCC researchers
had to market their organization to shareholders on a continual basis, while
shareholders had to make extra efforts to transfer technology back to their
organizations.
The U.S. Department of Defense had a longer history of promoting
research on computer hardware and software. Many of the results have
benefitted the world industry -- the Multics time-sharing system, the Ada
language, very-large scale integrated circuits, and various other tools and
techniques, as well as basic research. In contrast to Japan and MCC, however,
a common theme in defense research has been the focus of research and
applications on military uses, thus limiting the total impact of cooperative
ventures on the U.S. commercial sector. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, the defense
department seemed to shift somewhat and exhibited more interest in basic
problems in software engineering and potentially general solutions, in response
to the growing complexity and expense of software for modern weaponry and
other defense as well as informaiton systems.
For example, the Department of Defense in 1982 initiated STARS (Software
Technology for Adaptable, Reliable Systems) as a multi-year industry,
government, and university effort, with annual budgeting of around $60 million.
This included the establishment of a Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie-
Mellon University in 1985, where a staff of 250 researched new software tools
and methods as well as evaluated factory concepts, much like the Sigma Project.
In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
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(DARPA) directly sponsored several projects that overlapped with the technical
themes being explored in the Fifth Generation Project and FASET, as well as
Japanese corporations, besides making grants to U.S. universities for research in
every major area of computer hardware and software technology.
Of particular prominence among the DARPA projects was the Strategic
Computing Initiative, a $600-million, 5-year effort begun in 1983-1984. This
brought together university, government, and industry researchers to study
parallel architectures for symbolic computing, advanced microelectronics, and
new hardware, with the objective, to an extent inspired by the Japanese Fifth
Generation Project, of integrating vision, speech recognition and production,
natural-language understanding, and expert systems, especially but not
exclusively for military applications.4 2 Compared to ICOT, however, progress in
meeting research targets seemed slow, except for parallel-processing
architectures .43
Major European electronics firms and governments had their equivalents of
Sigma and the Fifth Generation, as well as the Strategic Computing Initiative
and STARS. In all cases, similar to the Japanese and U.S. programs, the
Europeans hoped to advance and diffuse basic knowledge in Al and other
technologies, as well as make tools and methods available to a broad range of
producers. In contrast to the recent Japanese initiatives, the European efforts
seemed less focused, in part because the Europeans tended to fund efforts
promoted by individual firms and give companies the right to commercialize the
results of their R&D, rather than allowing firms to work, in effect, as
subcontractors under a joint project. 4 4
The European Strategic Program for Research and Development in
Information Technologies (ESPRIT), begun in 1984, probably attracted the most
attention in Europe, spending $1.5 billion on more than 200 projects. The
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research included 47 projects devoted to software technologies -- knowledge
engineering and expert systems, advanced computer architectures, and improved
user-machine interfaces, similar to the Fifth Generation, as well as applied tool
and methodology development, similar to Sigma. Several groups worked on
method and tool integration as well as reuse technology for a software-factory
environment, with an analogue to the Sigma tool set, PCTE (Portable Common
Tools Environment), based on UNIX V. The main firm behind this initiative,
Bull of France, offered PCTE on its work stations. Other firms followed,
including GEC and ICL in the United Kingdom, Nixdorf and Siemens in
Germany, Olivetti in Italy, and Sun Microsystems in the U.S.
Another cooperative program, the EUREKA (European Research
Coordination Agency) Software Factory Project (ESF), worked on developing a
tool set and integrated environment resembling PCTE but tailored for specific
applications such as real-time software development and complex business
programming. The development group consisted of Nixdorf, AEG, ICL, and
several other firms in Germany, the U.K., Norway, and Sweden. Individual
countries had other efforts exploring similar tools and techniques, with perhaps
the largest consisting of Britain's Alvey program, modeled after the Fifth
Generation in objectives but resembling ESPRIT in organization, with 2000
researchers from universities and companies working on 200 separate projects.4 5
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
In contrast to the technology and the market, government direction and
subsidies, including cooperative inter-firm projects, played a very small role in
promoting the factory approach and supporting technologies in Japan. This is
not to say that the Japanese government did not try to do more. Various
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agencies sponsored cooperative efforts between the 1960s and early 1980s aimed
at promoting tools, techniques, and concepts effectively used in factory
environments. Yet none of the government-led projects seemed to have
anywhere near as much impact on practice as the initiatives started and
completed at individual firms. By the mid-1980s, the situation had begun to
change slightly. Old and new standards still competed for acceptance, and
software continued to come in many sizes and shapes -- maintaining a complex,
fragmented industry of uncertain dimensions. But it seemed clearer what
constituted good practice and where the key challenges in standardization or
R&D remained. As a result, Japanese and other firms started to cooperate more
actively and, as it seemed in the case of Sigma, more effectively.
Cooperation clearly proved necessary to further standardization. Japan
especially exhibited a great need to spread good tools and techniques to the
hundreds of small software houses that did programming work for larger
software producers and other customers. Standardization and networks, such as
with Sigma, helped make this possible. Even projects that failed to meet
objectives at least familiarized companies with software-engineering concepts
and tools, as well as with packages and operating systems such as UNIX. But,
while Sigma appeared likely to be an effective environment for software
development, firms still had to experiment with more advanced technologies, and
cooperation seemed useful to complement to efforts at individual firms. FASET,
TRON, and the Fifth Generation, in addition to company laboratories, provided a
mechanism to explore basic technologies as well as potential applications.
In the short term, standardization around UNIX and Sigma work stations
promised to help small firms raise their level of tool support. At the same
time, these or other standards would probably delay the Japanese from moving
to newer technologies as they appeared. TRON provided a good example, since
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it offered a higher level of integration for different types of hardware and
software. But while Japanese companies were introducing TRON products,
particularly for industrial real-time settings and educational applications, they
also maintained much larger commitments to UNIX, proprietary operating
systems, or IBM-compatibility.
In parallel computing and logic processing, Japanese government officials
and researchers focused their efforts and created a fascinating project for a
fifth-generation computer, but bet perhaps too heavily on a narrow aspect of
artificial-intelligence technology and had difficulty maintaining the interest of
major Japanese firms. FASET seemed more ambitious than Sigma technically
and more practical than ICOT in pioneering a critical area -- producing
executable requirements -- but lacked strong participation from key companies,
who had their own RD projects on the same theme.
One might also argue that the sheer variety of activity in Japan served as
much to fragment precious engineering and financial resources as it helped push
forward the state of computer technology and the capabilities of individual
firms. But Japanese managers appeared to recognize this, and companies tended
to limit their participation in government-sponsored projects. In the long term,
however, as international comparisons indicate, Japanese firms seemed well
prepared for present and future competition, covering nearly all major areas of
standardization, management, and research, and exploring these areas relatively
thoroughly.
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Table 8.1:Japanese Cooperative R&D Projects in Software Technology
Note: In 1989 currency, 1 Billion Yen = Approximately $7 Million
Period Project/Organization Objectives and Outcomes
(Total Yen Funding)
1966-72 Japan Software Company Common development language and
(2 billion) basic software for different
architectures. Complete failure.
1970-82 IPA Package Effort 70 packages developed. Very limited
(10 billion) usage.
1971-80 PIPS Project Pattern-information (graphics)
(22 billion) software, mainly for Japanese
language processing. Several
products commercialized. Links with
Fifth Generation Project.
1973-76 Software Module Project Applications development. Little
(3 billion) coordination. Complete failure.
1976-81 Production Technology Automated and integrated factory
Project (7.5 billion) tool set and modularization
techniques for batch environment.
20 discrete tools finally developed
by individual firms.
1981-86 Software Maintenance Interactive, UNIX-based tool set
Engineering Facility for maintenance and development.
Project (5 billion) Improved experience level of
Japanese firms with UNIX.
1984- TRON Project Development of a standardized
(Company Funds) architecture and operating system
for multiple levels and types of
computers. Some products
announced. Promising idea despite
competition from other standards.
1985-89 Interoperable Database Network to link work stations
System Project using OSI protocols. Improvement
(1.5 billion) of interface standards likely.
1985-89 FASET Project Development of CASE tools for
(2.2 billion) automated code generation from
formalized specifications. Promising
goals but limited participation.
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1985-90 Sigma Project Development of UNIX-based support(25 billion) tools as well as reusable code and
packages, for a national network.
Major dissemination of existing
practical technology.
1982-91 Fifth Generation Project Development of knowledge
(50 billion) (logical-inference) processing and
parallel computing hardware and
software. Major long-term advances
possible in Japanese Al capabilities.
Short-term potential for software
automation and reuse support.
Limited commercial applications,
however, and lukewarm support
from major companies.
Source: See citations in Chapter 8.
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Figure 8.1: FASET PROJECT DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
KnowLcug cataca
CD : tcols
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Source: "FASET -- Formal Approach to Software Environments Technology--
Overview of FASET Project," p. 3.
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Figure 8.2: SIGMA SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Source: Akima and Ooi, p. 15.
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Figure 8.4: FIFTH-GENERATION COMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
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Figure 8.5: FIFTH-GENERATION PROJECT WORKING GROUPS
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Knowledge System Shell
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Source: ICOT 1986, p. 30.
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Figure 8.6: NTT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
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Source: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, "Software Development
Division Outline," July 1986, p. 4.
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Figure 8.7: MITSUBISHI'S SOFTWARE REUSE SYSTEM
Source: Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, "Software Reuse -- Our Approach,"
Kamakura, Computer Works, 1986.
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